This paper analyzes individual decision making. It is assumed that an individual does not have a preference relation on the set of lotteries. Instead, the primitive of choice is a choice probability that captures the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over the other. Choice probabilities have a stochastic utility representation if they can be written as a nondecreasing function of the difference in expected utilities of the lotteries. Choice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if and only if they are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common consequences and interchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect but not with a common consequence effect. Special cases of stochastic utility include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994) . Harless and Camerer (1994) .
I. Introduction
Experimental studies of repeated decision making under risk demonstrate that individual choices are often contradictory. For example, Camerer (1989) reports that 31.6% of subjects reversed their choices when presented with the same binary choice problem for the second time. Starmer and Sugden (1989) find that 26.5% of all choices are reversed on the second repetition of a decision problem. Hey and Orme (1994) report an inconsistency rate of 25% even when individuals are allowed to declare indifference. Wu (1994) finds that 5% to 45% of choice decisions are reversed (depending on a lottery pair) when decision problem is repeated. Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report a median switching rate of 20.8%
Although experimental data convincingly show that choice under risk is generally stochastic, this finding remains largely ignored in the theoretical work (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998) . The majority of decision theories assume that individuals are born with a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries, which typically does not allow for a possibility of stochastic choice (unless individuals happen to be exactly indifferent). As a notable exception, Machina (1985) and Chew et al. (1991) develop a model of stochastic choice as a result of deliberate randomization by individuals with quasi-concave preferences. However, Hey and Carbone (1995) find that randomness in the observed choices generally cannot be attributed to conscious randomization.
Deterministic decision theories derive representation of unique preference relation and predict that repeated choice is always consistent (except for decision problems where an individual is exactly indifferent). Strictly speaking, all deterministic theories are falsified by experimental data. However, a common approach is to embed a deterministic decision 3 theory into a model of stochastic choice and fit this compound structure to empirical data.
Three models of stochastic choice have been suggested in the literature.
The simplest model is a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994) . Individuals have a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries but they do not choose according to their preferences all the time. With probability 0 > p a tremble occurs and individuals choose an alternative which is not their preferred option. With probability p − 1 individuals act in accordance with their preferences. Carbone (1997) and Loomes et al. (2002) find that this constant error model fails to explain the experimental data and it is essentially "inadequate as a general theory of stochastic choice".
The Fechner model of random errors was originally proposed by Fechner (1860).
Individuals possess a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries Λ but they reveal their preferences with a random error as a result of carelessness, slips, insufficient motivation etc. (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) . Preference relation is assumed to have utility representation R → Λ : U so that it is possible to evaluate a relative advantage 
, where ε is a random error.
In a classical Fechner model, random error ε is drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and constant standard deviation (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) . Hey (1995) and Buschena and Zilberman (2000) assume that error term is heteroscedastic i.e. the standard deviation of ε is higher in certain decision problems, for example, when lotteries have many possible outcomes. Blavatskyy (2007) develops a model where random error ε is drawn from a truncated normal distribution.
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Finally, the third model of stochastic choice is a random utility model. Individuals are endowed with several preference relations over the set of risky lotteries and a probability measure over those preference relations. When faced with a decision problem, individuals first draw a preference relation and then choose an alternative which they prefer according to the selected preference relation (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1995) .
This paper uses alternative framework for analyzing individual decision making.
Since repeated decisions are often inconsistent, a natural interpretation of this fact is that individuals do not have a unique preference relation on the set of risky lotteries. It is assumed that individuals possess choice probabilities that capture the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over another lottery. These choice probabilities serve as primitives of choice and they admit stochastic utility representation if they satisfy five intuitive axioms.
A preference relation can be easily translated into choice probabilities. Thus, there is no need for a stochastic choice model as a mediator between a deterministic preference relation and an empirical stochastic choice pattern. A related axiomatization of choice probabilities for riskless alternatives is given in Debreu (1958) and for risky lotteries-in Fishburn (1978) . In particular, Fishburn (1978) represents choice probabilities by an increasing function of the ratio of incremental expected utility advantages of two lotteries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces an alternative framework, where primitives of choice are choice probabilities rather than a deterministic preference relation. Section III presents five intuitively appealing properties (axioms) of individual choice probabilities. Section IV contains the main result of the paper-a representation theorem (stochastic utility theorem) for choice probabilities and discusses its main implications and possible extensions. Section V concludes. 
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II. Framework
represents the probability
is clearly observable from a (relative) frequency with which an individual chooses 1 L when he or she is asked to choose repeatedly between 1 L and 2 L . A deterministic preference relation can be easily converted into a choice probability.
. Thus, a deterministic binary preference relation on Λ , which is a starting building block of nearly all decision theories, can be considered as a special case of a more general framework where individual decisions are governed by choice probabilities.
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III. Axioms
Axiom 1 (Completeness) For any two lotteries 
L is preferred over 1 L or both. Axiom 1 can be extended by allowing for a "neutral" event when an individual does not care about a choice problem and delegates choice decision to an arbitrary third party e.g. a coin toss (but bears the consequences of the third party decision). However, empirical evidence suggests that such option, when available, is seldom used (Camerer, 1989) and it is not necessary for a theoretical analysis.
Axiom 2 (Strong Stochastic Transitivity) For any three lotteries
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For any three lotteries
Intuitively, continuity insures that a small change in the probability distribution over outcomes does not result in a significant change in the choice probabilities.
Axiom 4 (Common Consequence Independence) For any four lotteries
7 Axiom 4 states that binary choice probabilities are independent of the consequences that are common to both choice alternatives. In other words, if two lotteries yield identical chances of the same outcome (or, more generally, if two compound lotteries yield identical chances of the same risky lottery) this common consequence does not affect the probability that one of the lotteries is chosen over the other.
Axiom 4 is weaker than condition ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
and any probability [ ]
The latter condition can be interpreted as a stochastic version of the independence axiom of expected utility theory.
Axiom 5 (Interchangeability) For any three lotteries
Axiom 5 states that if an individual is equally likely to choose either of the two lotteries in a direct binary choice, then these two lotteries can be interchanged in any other decision problem without affecting the choice probabilities. Intuitively, if an individual chooses between two lotteries at random then he or she does not mind which of the two lotteries is involved in another decision problem. For example, consider an individual who is completely indifferent between Chinese and Thai food. In this case, interchangeability would imply that the chances that this individual opts for a Chinese restaurant over an Indian restaurant are just as high as the chances that he or she chooses a Thai restaurant over an Indian restaurant.
Axiom 5 holds trivially for a transitive binary preference relation. 
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IV. Stochastic Utility Theorem
Proof is presented in the Appendix.
Function ( )
.
Ψ has to satisfy a restriction ( ) ( ) Luce and Suppes, 1965; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996) . Finally, if
utility representation becomes a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994) .
Axiomatization of stochastic utility allows characterizing the above mentioned models in terms of the properties of individual choice probabilities that are observable from empirical data and that can be directly tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. In particular, axioms allow us to relate stochastic utility theory to the well known stylized empirical facts about individual choice behavior under risk. Unlike expected utility theory, stochastic utility theory is consistent with systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect. However, subjective choice probabilities that admit stochastic utility representation cannot exhibit a common consequence effect.
and a choice of
. Systematic violations of betweenness are observed if A happens more frequently than B or vice versa (e.g. Camerer and Ho, 1994) . If binary choices are independent then ( ) B A is observed more frequently than ( )
Axioms 2 and 4 then
is greater (smaller) than one half. Thus, stochastic utility can exhibit a pattern known as systematic violations of betweenness (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2006) . . A common ratio effect is observed when ( ) ( ) 
. Thus, stochastic utility is consistent with a common ratio
but it cannot explain a common ratio effect Loomes, 2005) .
A common consequence effect is observed when Allais, 1953) . Choice probabilities that admit stochastic utility representation cannot exhibit common consequence effect because Axiom 4 implies ( ) ( )
To accommodate a common consequence effect within stochastic utility framework Axiom 4 can be replaced with a stochastic analogue of one of the axioms of non-expected utility theories. For example, Axiom 4 can be weakened into Axiom 4a.
Axiom 4a (Betweenness) For any
that satisfies Axioms 1-3, 4a and 5 can be represented by implicit stochastic utility
, where
is implicit expected utility of a lottery (e.g. Dekel, 1986) . Thus, stochastic utility theorem can be extended to represent choice probabilities that do not necessarily exhibit common consequence independence.
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V. Conclusion
One of the robust findings from experimental research on repeated decision making is that individuals often make contradictory choices when they face the same binary choice problem within a short period of time. This evidence suggests that individuals do not possess a unique preference relation on the space of risky lotteries Λ . Either individuals have multiple preference relations on Λ that can be represented by a random utility model (recently axiomatized by Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) or individuals have a probability measure on Λ × Λ that can be represented by stochastic utility model.
Stochastic utility captures the observed randomness in binary choice probabilities.
Thus, stochastic utility merely represents probabilistic choice behavior and it is not necessarily related to the risk associated with the choice alternatives. In fact, an individual can make probabilistic choices even over riskless choice alternatives (e.g. Debreu, 1958) . It is also possible to interpret stochastic utility as a representation of a fuzzy preference relation (e.g. Zimmerman et al., 1984) on the set of risky lotteries Λ . However, this paper refers to the primitives of choice as choice probabilities rather than fuzzy preferences to avoid confusion with a classical binary preference relation.
This paper shows that choice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if and only if they are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common consequences and interchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with several choice patterns (such as systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect) that contradict to the axioms of expected utility framework. Special cases of stochastic utility representation include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994) .
At least one axiom of stochastic utility-common consequence independence-has been extensively tested in controlled experiments and it is known to be frequently violated (e.g. the Allais paradox). However, interchangeability axiom is likely to be problematic too.
When lottery outcomes are monetary, choice among outcomes for certain is deterministic.
In fact, when one lottery transparently first-order stochastically dominates the other lottery, subjects seldom choose a dominated alternative (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998) . Thus, reality appears to be somewhere between a deterministic decision theory derived from a preference relation and a stochastic decision theory derived from choice probabilities.
Apparently, an individual possesses a preference relation on a non-empty subset of Λ (that includes, for example, the set of lottery outcomes) and a probability measure on
. The preference relation allows to make cognitively undemanding decisions, e.g.
when one alternative clearly dominates the other alternative, and the probability measure governs the remaining decisions. Such a hybrid model of decision making can be characterized within the framework of choice probabilities introduced in this paper because a deterministic preference relation can be easily translated into choice probabilities. A restriction on the interchangeability axiom so that it holds only when lotteries do not transparently dominate each other appears to be a necessary first step for extending stochastic utility theorem along these lines.
Before we prove Theorem 1, it is convenient to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma A1 If Axioms 1-5 hold then for any
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exist
[ ]
. Continuity axiom implies that the sets belongs to the second set), there is at least one β that belongs to both sets. Notice that this β cannot be zero because (
. This is the first element of our
and we have a second element of our sequence 
Continuity implies that the sets
belongs to both of these sets. Hence, the limit of the sequence α = ∞ → n n a lim also belongs to both of these sets. This implies that
. However, this contradicts to our initial assumption that
. We arrive at a similar contradiction if we assume that there exist
. This completes the proof of Lemma A1.
Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward to verify that if function Let i D denote a degenerate lottery that delivers outcome X x i ∈ with probability one,
,..., 1 ∈ . Since the set of possible outcomes X is finite, completeness and strong stochastic transitivity imply that outcomes can be ordered so that (
. Next we prove that Notice that an arbitrary lottery ( )
can be written as a compound lottery
to the assumption of mathematical induction and ( ) 2 1 ,
due to the ordering of outcomes, strong stochastic transitivity implies that
if the latter is written as a compound
lotteries n D and 1 D are correspondingly "the best" and "the worst" lottery in Λ i.e.
We will first consider the case when
strong stochastic transitivity implies that
it must be the case that 
Suppose there is
by strong stochastic transitivity.
Common consequence independence implies that 
By a similar pattern, common consequence independence implies that 
. Therefore it must be the case that 
. However, we already considered this case at the beginning of this proof. Therefore it must be the case that
. In other words, for any 
If 2 
Ψ is defined as ( ) ( 
